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NETWORK FOR A EUROPEAN DEMOI-CRACY: ARE THE 
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS UP TO THE JOB?*
Vesco Paskalev **
‘It would be madness and inconsistency to sup-
pose that things which have never yet been per-
formed can be performed without employing some 
hitherto untried means.’1
Summary: This article focuses on the new opportunity for the natio-
nal parliaments to get involved in the EU legislative process which 
is provided by the so-called yellow card mechanism introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty. I start with a discussion of the incentives for na-
tional parliaments to seize the new opportunity to influence Europe-
an decision-making. I argue that the importance of the mechanism 
goes far beyond its stated goal to enforce the subsidiarity principle. 
Its true significance will first be in the engagement of parliaments in 
debates on the substantive issues of European policy, and second in 
stimulating cooperation amongst the parliaments of different Member 
States. In turn, this engagement and cooperation of parliaments can 
be expected to bring about communication among the citizens across 
national public spheres and their engagement with substantive policy 
issues rather than merely arguing for or against integration as is the 
case today. Thus, this modest-looking mechanism promises to nur-
ture a transnational network of public spheres and to become what 
may be called a demoi-cracy. I also argue that the creation of such a 
network democracy (post-national rather than supra-national) is the 
only available road for democratisation of the EU because it does not 
depend on a forged common identity or solidarity. In the final section, 
I discuss experience with the mechanism during its first year, which 
seems disappointing.
*  A shorter and earlier version of this article was published as a working paper of the Euro-
pean University Institute, Florence (WP 21/2009 Law) <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/
handle/1814/13005/ LAW_2009_20.pdf? sequence=1>, accessed 22 September 2011, and 
on the SSRN. I am grateful to the participants of the Jean Monnet seminar ‘Advanced Issues 
of European Law’, Dubrovnik, April 2011 for their very considerate and helpful comments.
**  The author is a PhD researcher at the European University Institute, Florence, and has 
been advisor to the Committee on European Integration of the Bulgarian Parliament.
1  Francis Bacon, Novum Organum: True Directions Concerning the Interpretation of Nature 
(first published 1629, Kessinger Publishing 2004).
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Introduction
On 1 December 2010 the Lisbon Treaty entered into force and fi-
nalised a decade-long torturous process that polarised the opinions of 
scholars, politicians and citizens throughout Europe. But if there is anyt-
hing in the Treaty which should be cheered by all sides of the debate on 
European integration, it is the ‘yellow card’ mechanism, conceived by 
the Convention on the Future of Europe with the heading Early Warning 
Mechanism (EWM).2 It provides the institutional framework for public 
deliberation on issues of European governance, within national parlia-
ments (NPs) and also between them. It should be liked by the sceptics 
as it subjects the Union legislation to national scrutiny, but also by the 
federalists as it can be expected to create the much craved European 
public sphere. In my view, this is the kind of mechanism needed to de-
mocratise the Union and to make it open, inclusive and responsive to the 
will of all European citizens who may, but also may not, have much in 
common. Its core virtue is that it creates incentives for public discourse 
on substantive common issues first within the national public spheres of 
the Member States, and second, and more importantly, among the NPs 
in a network which in the long run can amount to an overarching dis-
cursive network of interconnected public spaces. Until now, the public 
spheres in Europe have remained largely national and the emergence of a 
robust single European one is nowhere in sight. Arguably, the EWM can 
foster communication within a network of autonomous but interconnec-
ted public spheres which, if robust enough, is the critical condition for 
the emergence of a transnational democracy. If successful, Europe may 
become a single and democratic polity for many distinct demoi and, con-
trary to the famous appeal of Habermas and Derrida,3 without forging a 
common European identity beforehand. 
It is ironic that I have to argue with Habermas using the arguments 
from his own earlier works,4 but in my view his latest papers on European 
values do not fit easily with the concept of critical deliberation in the public 
sphere; according to his theory of communicative action, there seems to 
be no need for common values, identity or solidarity to have a democracy, 
2  As the Lisbon Treaty does not name this mechanism, I will use the abandoned ‘Early 
Warning Mechanism’ and ‘EWM’ for convenience, or the yellow card, which is how it has 
come to be popularly known since the Convention. 
3  Jürgen Habermas & Jacques Derrida, ‘February 15, or What Binds Europeans To-
gether: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe’ (2003) 10 
Constellations 291.
4  See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry 
Into a Category of Bourgeois Society (MIT Press 1991), hereinafter Public Sphere; Jürgen 
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and De-
mocracy (Polity Press 1996), hereinafter BFN; and Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the 
Other: Studies in Political Theory (MIT Press 1998), hereinafter The Other.
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whether a transnational one or not.5 I take decision-making through inclu-
sive and rational public deliberation to be the critical condition for a go-
vernment of the people(s), hence democracy may be easier in a community 
of people united by identity, but it is at least conceptually possible also in 
a group of strangers who have nothing in common but two interests: an 
interest in common governance and an interest in subjecting it to public 
criticism. Thus, to make governance democratic, only a robust and inclu-
sive discussion in which common opinions are formed is necessary. I take 
it for granted that interest for common governance in practically all areas 
of life for all people in Europe exists. Now with the EU in place to realise 
this governance, the second is of concern to us: that the people subjected 
to common governance are in turn enabled to subject the existing system 
of governance to public criticism and make its decisions responsive to the 
shared opinions they form. The obvious condition for the opinions to be 
common is that the critical discussion must transcend the national fora 
where it originates. This is what happened at least once - on 15 Febru-
ary 2003: the antiwar opinions transcended the national spheres where 
they were formed and became common, ie they were formed by the critical 
communicative exchanges of all citizens, even though in terms of identity 
these people remained Germans, French and English, rather than Europe-
ans.6 This suggests that paneuropean public deliberation and public opi-
nion is possible, even when none of the participants considers himself ‘Eu-
ropean’. The difficulty is that for the opinions formed to be transnational, 
the public discourses need to transcend their usual national loci, ie people 
from different Member States need to speak to and listen not only to their 
compatriots, but to the citizens of other states, and this is exactly what the 
EWM can incentivise. The EWM was proposed as a network which fosters 
communication without the need for a new institution to be established, 
and in the same vein it can encourage democratic discourse without the 
need for a single demos to be forged.
In the following section I briefly discuss the project for the construc-
tion of European identity and/or a European public sphere, as advan-
ced by Habermas’s later writings, the former German foreign minister 
Joschka Fisher and many other intellectuals. I raise several objections 
against its necessity and argue that this is a solution to the wrong pro-
blem. While the identity elements of this project are contested, critical 
communication stands out as the one irreducible element of a delibera-
tive democratic system. In the third section, I explore how the EWM may 
become the institutional vehicle to realise it in a debating network of par-
5  For a similar argument, see Justine Lacroix, ‘Does Europe Need Common Values? 
Habermas vs Habermas’ (2009) 8 European Journal of Political Theory 141.
6  This is supported by the annual Eurobarometer surveys, but also by the fact that many 
Americans (estimated at about 500,000 in New York City alone) demonstrated against the 
war on that date, and hence apparently did not become European.  
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liaments. Then I argue why a critical network rather than a single critical 
public sphere is both a more realistic and more desirable solution. In the 
final section I discuss experience with the mechanism in its first year, 
and in that light the prospects for bringing the Union closer to its citizens 
appear much grimmer.
The constructivist project 
It can be assumed intuitively that a paneuropean sense of solidarity 
and identity is a sine qua non for any kind of common governance, and 
even more so in order to make this governance a democratic one. That is 
why systematic projects to forge a European identity started with the very 
birth of the EEC, and purely intellectual exercises in that can be traced 
back to the Middle Ages. The notion of the democratic deficit arose more 
recently, with the creation of the political union by the Maastricht Treaty 
and with the increased ambitions for even more comprehensive political 
integration. In response to the deficit stick and the ambitions carrot, the 
identity issue came to the fore, and found its culmination during the 
deliberations of the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-2003). 
Paradoxically, at precisely the same time Europe appeared more divi-
ded than ever on the Iraq war. Despite the apparent division among the 
governments, many European intellectuals, with Jürgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida being the most famous, noticed the actual commonality 
of the opinion of European citizens. This prompted their famous ‘Decla-
ration’ which announced and welcomed the birth of the ‘European Public 
Sphere’.7 Habermas and Derrida were right in their announcement, but 
for the wrong reasons. (I cannot help adding that six years later the child 
is still in its nappies and is unlikely to grow to maturity anytime soon.) 
Actually, in the ‘Declaration’ itself, Habermas is ambiguous about his 
reasons for celebration: on one side, he states that ‘A transformative poli-
tics, which demand that member states … form a common will, must take 
recourse to the motives and attitudes of the citizens themselves’.8 This 
need for the formation of a common will of Member States which corres-
ponds to the will of the citizens is very much in line with Habermas’s 
earlier views expounded in the ‘Public Sphere’ and ‘BFN’. On the other 
side, he claims that ‘Only the consciousness of a shared political fate … 
can halt the outvoted minorities from obstruction of majority will’.9 This 
second claim seems a step back from his original and more ambitious 
concept that through inclusive deliberation of free and equal citizens in 
7  Jürgen Habermas & Jacques Derrida, ‘February 15, or What Binds Europeans To-
gether: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe’ (2003) 10 
Constellations, hereinafter ‘Declaration’, 291.
8  Habermas, ‘Declaration’ (n 7) 293, emphasis of the original.
9  Habermas, ‘Declaration’ (n 7) 293.
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a common public sphere a common will must be formed, which cannot 
be equated with the will of the majority. This is contrary to the Roussea-
uian formula Habermas had referred to in The Other, according to which 
the ‘democratically structured opinion- and will-formation make possible 
rational agreement even between strangers. Because the democratic pro-
cess guarantees legitimacy in virtue of its procedural characteristics, it 
can if necessary bridge gaps in social integration’.10 Only a few years ago, 
Habermas seems to have supported the concept of ‘procedural popular 
sovereignty’ at the core of which was only ‘the practice of deliberation 
between participants in communication who want to arrive at rationally 
motivated decisions’.11      
I strongly support his first claim, but find the second worrisome for 
two reasons. First, if the ‘consciousness of shared fate’ is a valid require-
ment for European democracy, then it becomes imperative for European 
identity to be constructed out of thin air as soon as needed. Second, this 
claim betrays the ambitions of his own theory of deliberative democracy 
to be sustainable in a community of strangers who remain strangers.12 
In the ‘Declaration’, as well as in many of his other recent writings,13 
Habermas points to ‘the reciprocal acknowledgment of the Other in his 
otherness’,14 yet he goes a long way along the second path in enumera-
ting ‘European values’ which are shared by all and thus can form the 
foundation of European identity-as-attachment-to-them: preference for 
the welfare state, secularisation, a ‘keen sense of the dialectic of enli-
ghtenment’ and ‘no naively optimistic expectations about technological 
progress’. Although I generally share all of these values, they are either 
far from common (for the almost half a billion citizens living in 27 diffe-
rent Member States!) or have become universal, as Habermas himself 
acknowledges. In either of the two cases, these values apparently lack 
the commonality which is necessary to rally the outvoted minority behind 
the will of the winning majority. He is perhaps most explicit in these con-
structivist efforts in ‘Why Europe’,15 where he promotes the concept of a 
European ‘distinctive form of life’. It is not very clear what it means, yet 
matched with the social agenda advanced in the same article, it must be 
quite a thick concept. 
10  Habermas, The Other (n 4) 138.
11  Habermas, The Other (n 4) 138.
12  There is a third reason that is not relevant for this paper – if deliberative democracy 
needs a sense of identity and shared values, apparently it cannot make a normative foun-
dation for a world government. 
13  For example, see Jürgen Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution?’ (2001) 11 New 
Left Review 5-26, hereinafter ‘Why Europe’ in Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West (Polity 
Press 2006). Here is not the place to go into detail to show how the allegedly common values 
are incompatible with the existing variety in Europe.
14  Habermas, ‘Declaration’ (n 7) 294.
15  Habermas, ‘Why Europe’ (n 13).
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All this is disappointing, because one of the most significant contri-
butions of Habermas to the European democracy debate is his dismissal 
of the ‘no-demos thesis’ by showing that the demos is self-constituting 
and that demos and democracy co-originate in a circular stepwise proce-
ss: ‘the collective identity … exists neither independent of nor prior to the 
democratic process from which it springs’16 and also: 
A prior background consensus based on a homogeneous culture is 
not necessary, because democratically structured opinion- and will-
formation make possible rational agreement even between strangers.17
And once again:
It is through the shared will to found a state and, as a consequence 
of this resolution, through the constitution-founding practice itself 
that the participants constitute themselves as a nation of citizens. 18
He applies this thesis to the demos-democracy relation after the 
constitutional moment too, but maintains the need for a single demos, 
self-constituted as it may be, in order to sustain the democracy after 
it. Indeed, citizens by his account ‘constitute themselves as a people, 
and thereby delimit themselves both socially and territorially from their 
environment’.19 He discusses this in further detail in the Postnational 
Constellation, describing a process of historic oscillation between the ope-
ning of the existing lifeworlds upon new impulses toward modernisation 
and then closing once more at a higher level.20 But a European polity 
created in this way will be quasi-national and not post-national, and thus 
his project for the creation of European identity, albeit thinner than a 
national one, justly faces the virulent objections of Eurosceptics. 
Habermas’s reason to stop short of disposing of demos completely 
is his desire for a more substantial content of democracy.21 He needs the 
constructed new identity not to make the existing Union more democratic 
(liberally-democratic), but to enable it go farther and to make it socially-
democratic (perhaps he would respond to this by denying that such a 
distinction exists).22 But this is a non-starter: in order to provide ground 
16  Habermas, ‘Why Europe’ (n 13) 15.
17  Habermas, The Other (n 4) 137-138.
18  Habermas, The Other (n 4) 140.
19  The Other (n 4) 140. In this, Habermas was echoed by Joschka Fisher in his famous 
speech ‘From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration’, 
delivered at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000.
20  Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (MIT Press 2001) 83.
21  His craving for solidarity to sustain Europe-wide redistributive policies permeates virtu-
ally all of his writings on Europe. The most recent example is his essay ‘Is the Development 
of a European Identity Necessary, and Is It Possible?” in The Divided West (n 13).
22  The ongoing crisis with the Greek sovereign debt shows that redistribution may be nee-
ded not only for social purposes, but this does not undermine my argument that identity is 
needed not to democratise governance but to allow for certain substantive goals.
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for the problematic redistribution at the European level, Habermas su-
ggests even more problematic identity creation. By doing this, he unites 
against himself the neo-liberals and the nationalists, enabling their so far 
separate arguments to reinforce each other.
I will leave him to this double challenge alone, and will focus on the 
problem with the outvoted minority. It seems that Habermas will agree 
that the problem appears only from a broader perspective, eg if redis-
tributive decisions of a much larger scale are to be taken. But in the EU 
of today there are rarely any clear contradictions between immediately 
identifiable majorities and minorities. For example, in the current debt 
crisis no one has ever counted majorities for or against certain positions 
(although cleavages between North and South, or thrifty and profligate 
countries, do appear. In less salient issues, this is even more so, because, 
in Abromeit’s apt description, the Union is: 
characterised by 1) various levels (community, member states, sub-
national units) as well as 2) various dimensions (territorial and 
‘functional’) of policy making; that combines (3) highly complex for-
mal (institutionalised) as well as (4) equally complex informal ways 
of decision-making; that binds together, furthermore, (5) actors of 
varying degrees of ‘Europeanization’, acting (6) in policy areas of 
different degrees of Europeanization and (7) with different numbers 
of participants, agreeing policies (8) under different decision rules.23 
The sheer complexity in such a system helps to avoid the cleavages 
that the forged European identity is supposed to mitigate – often it is im-
possible to identify the winners and the losers of the policies. For exam-
ple, the current bailouts may appear to benefit Greece and Ireland at the 
expense of Germany, but they also benefit the German banks who were 
recklessly crediting these countries. Christopher Lord aptly noted that ‘it 
is unsurprising that a great many Union procedures are aimed at avoiding 
such a clash of majorities’.24 What we can all identify now is a complex 
web of regulation which is subjected to very limited, if any, critical public 
scrutiny. The EU legislative process is depoliticised and expert-driven to 
such an extent that it is impossible to identify the majority, the will or the 
reason behind the policy a citizen may dislike. Certainly, the popular press 
is able to ‘appoint’ winners and losers, but it has never been a champion of 
accuracy, and the complexity of the EU only makes this easier to do.
In my view, this lack of awareness and understanding is the cause 
of the democratic deficit, and this is to be overcome with communication 
23  Heidrun Abromeit, Democracy in Europe: Legitimising Politics in a Non-State Polity 
(Berghahn 1998) 8.
24  Christopher Lord, ‘New Governance and Post-Parliamentarism’ (2004) POLIS Working 
Paper, School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds 7.
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in the public sphere, and not by forging identity. Identification with an 
untransparent (or more precisely incomprehensively transparent) Europe 
will be no more democratic than identifying with the Charlemagne Empi-
re that preceded it.  It is not the outvoting of some, but the alienation of 
all which is problematic. Therefore, alienation will not be overcome if we 
all become constitutional patriots, but by fostering debates in the public 
sphere. Habermas does not notice that this democratic deficit was pre-
sent from the birth of the EEC25 and hints that for as long as the Europe-
an integration consisted only of the creation of a common market there 
was no need to make it more democratic. Yet the problem was there, only 
it was not seen by the public, and this is hardly surprising as the EEC 
itself was not noticeable to the public at large either. As I have noted, 
Habermas ignores the democracy deficit of the EEC because of his more 
ambitious goal to make the Union social-democratic. So he sees the EEC 
as a mere tool to bring the prosperity necessary for the national welfare 
state, and from such a perspective the need for supranational democracy 
does not exist. Now, as he sees the welfare state threatened by globalisa-
tion, the need to socially democratise the Union comes to the fore. And 
he is right that in order to sustain the redistributive policies dear to him, 
a European identity must be forged. But making it a liberal democracy is 
a precondition for this.
Here I need to distinguish myself from the common criticism of Uni-
on complexity. Let me be clear on this: the complexity of the EU is here 
for a purpose, and is here to stay. The complexity is not a historical pat-
hology of the Union, but is one of its main virtues, developed to protect 
the ever-growing diversity of interests in a continent-wide polity. In vain 
is the European identity commonly advanced to solve this problem as 
well – this is the line of reasoning of the federalists, to which Habermas 
arguably can be enlisted, but which is better exemplified by Joschka 
Fisher.26 Apart from the lack of intellectual imagination, this thesis lacks 
realism as well. To substitute all the mechanisms of the existing con-
sociational democracy with a federation with parliamentary government 
requires a very robust sense of identity, much greater than mere consti-
tutional patriotism provides, which (fortunately) is nowhere in sight. 
Thus, not identity but complexity is the circle the Union has to squa-
re: to find a way to make the European public(s) aware of the substantive 
25  Other critics have not missed that: Ian Ward notes that ‘Monnet designed a form of ad-
ministrative governance, for which democracy could only be an undesirable distraction’ (Ian 
Ward, ‘Identity and Democracy in the New Europe’ in Andrew Scott & Zenon Bankowski 
(eds), The European Union and Its Order: The Legal Theory of European Integration (Blackwell 
1999) 198).
26  Fisher (n 19). Perhaps the most recent call for the creation of a United States of Europe 
was made in 2006 by the former Belgian prime minister and current leader of the liberals 
in the European Parliament, Guy Verhofstadt.
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European policies, to enable them to criticise these policies and to form 
shared opinions on these substantive issues. I believe that a possible 
answer is provided by the deliberative democracy theory of Habermas in 
an attenuated version, ie by the concept of communicative action among 
strangers who have no special emotions towards the constitution of their 
community of communication. 
The Early Warning Mechanism as a communicative network 
Protocol 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality attached to the Lisbon Treaty entrusts the national par-
liaments (NPs) with responsibility, albeit a very limited one, to participate 
in the general legislative process of the EU.27 The responsibility is for 
soft control of the compliance of draft community legislation with the 
subsidiarity principle. According to arts 6 and 7 of the Protocol, all draft 
legislative acts will be submitted to NPs and they will have eight weeks28 
to express objections with reasoned opinions if the proposal violates the 
principle of subsidiarity.29 If one third30 of the NPs31 adopt such opinions, 
the Commission will have to ‘review’ it and ‘adopt a reasoned decision to 
maintain, amend or withdraw the draft’.  The control is soft, and cannot 
amount to a ‘red card’, ie no number of NPs can formally block any legi-
slative proposal.32 
27  Although their involvement was called for by the Protocols on the role of national parlia-
ments attached to the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, they did not go beyond providing the 
NPs with information (which today is published on the internet anyway) and encouraging 
them to control their own governments on European issues (which they do by virtue of na-
tional law in any case). Note also that the Lisbon Treaty provides for prior notification of the 
NPs when the bridging clause is employed (art 48, section 6 and 7, para 3 of the amended 
Treaty on EU) and they can effectively veto the decisions approved pursuant to it. While this 
is relevant for what amounts to treaty amendments rather than a substantial policy issue, 
this additional power will also result in deeper involvement of the parliaments.
28  The Council and the EP cannot consider the draft before the expiry of this period (art 4 
of the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments).
29  The same mechanism applies to any issue when the draft bill is to be adopted on the 
ground of the flexibility clause (art 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU).
30  One quarter of them in cases of proposals in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
31  In order to accommodate the bicameralism of some of the MSs, each parliament is given 
two ‘votes’, which are to be cast together by unicameral legislatures, and separately by each 
chamber in bicameral ones. 
32  There was such a proposal for the Convention - if a second threshold of two thirds of the 
NPs is reached, the Commission would be obliged to withdraw the draft legislation - but it 
was rejected. Instead, the Lisbon Treaty introduced an ‘orange card’, which provides that if 
half of the NPs opine negatively and the Commission still wants to maintain the proposal, 
it must provide a reasoned opinion on the subsidiarity issue and a separate vote must be 
taken on whether there is compliance with the subsidiarity principle, both in the EP and 
the Council (ie they may immediately vote it down), before they begin deliberation on the 
substance of the proposal (art 7, para 3 of the Protocol). For the purposes of the present 
article, the differences between the effect of the two ‘cards’, namely the extra votes in the EP 
and Council, are not relevant and will not be discussed.
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The immediate purpose of this mechanism is to give teeth to the 
subsidiarity principle33 and provide an institutionalised check on the 
creeping competences of the Union at the expense of MSs, ie of national 
parliaments. This new ex ante control is of substantial concern to some 
Member States, especially since so far the subsidiarity principle has been 
considered to be nonjusticeable. However, if my arguments in the present 
paper are correct, the effect of the EWM, because of its softness, will be 
more substantial not in terms of subsidiarity control, but in terms of pu-
blicity – in involving the NPs in deliberations of substantive community 
policies.34 
There are several reasons for observers to be sceptical about the 
prospects of the EWM. The most apparent is the limited time available for 
the adoption of the reasoned opinions. Although now the time has been 
extended to 8 weeks from the original 6 proposed in the Constitution, it 
is still considered too short to allow parliaments any real possibility to 
make meaningful use of the EWM. The other reason is the observable 
apathy of the NPs to engage in matters of substantive European policies. 
Students of parliaments in Europe have identified a number of rational 
disincentives, the most important of which are the ‘executive dominance’ 
common for all parliamentary systems and the classical tenet that the 
function of a parliament is not to engage in governance but only to hold 
the government to account. There are plenty of studies confirming these 
views empirically, and there is the telling example of COSAC which, du-
ring its two decades of existence, is all but redundant and virtually unno-
ticed even by academics.35  The third reason for scepticism is the lack of 
resources of NPs. Even if the parliaments wish to engage, they need si-
gnificant administrative and expert capacity for meaningful engagement 
in substantive European issues, which is nowhere the case. The fourth 
reason is that the control provided by the EWM is limited to subsidiarity 
33  It is noteworthy that the EWM is stipulated in the Protocol on the Principles of Subsi-
diarity and Proportionality, and not in the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments.
34  This is not to say that its impact on subsidiarity will not be significant. Even though it 
is not discussed here, it may prove to  be much ‘harder’ than expected:  Michael Dougan 
suggests the possibility of subtle interplay between the national parliaments and the ECJ: 
‘With such a wealth of material [provided by parliaments’ reasoned opinions], argumentati-
on over subsidiarity could metamorphose from the politically subjective into the readily ju-
sticiable” (Michael Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’ (2008) 
45 CML Rev 661). Similarly, Wyatt suggests that by the yellow card mechanism the NP in 
tandem with the ECJ can become an effective check on the EU legislation but can also ‘en-
hance the sense of ownership of the European project at the national level’ (Derrick Wyatt, 
‘Could a “Yellow Card” for National Parliaments Strengthen Judicial as well as Political 
Policing of Subsidiarity?’ (2006) 2 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy 1.
35  COSAC stands for the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of 
Parliaments of the European Union. It consists of members of the national parliaments 
which meet biannually, and was charged by the Treaty of Amsterdam to make contributions 
to the community institutions ‘in particular on the basis of draft legal texts’.  
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issues only. Even though under this guise many substantive objections 
may be raised, this still unduly blunts an edge whose sharpness is yet to 
be seen. Finally, this control is bound to be negative, and there is no way 
for NPs to make any positive proposal at any stage of the process. 
However, there are reasons to expect the EWM to work, too. The 
first is that the voice of the NPs is not weighted in the counting towards 
the threshold. Thus, the governments of small Member States who fear 
being outvoted in the Council may choose to use the NP they dominate 
to oppose the proposal. Second, the votes of the second chambers, which 
are usually sidelined in the domestic legislative process, are now equali-
sed, so this European mechanism may tempt some of their members to 
employ it for domestic purposes. This becomes all the more important 
having in mind that executive dominance is characteristic only of the 
chambers which elect and sustain the government, while the chambers 
which have no such responsibilities are free to seize this opportunity for 
engagement.36 Third, a government may choose to improve its bargaining 
position in the Council by having its parliament publicly committing it 
to a certain position.37 Fourth, the short deadline may indeed preclude 
most of the incentives of the NPs, but as a result the parliaments will 
have their say before the government minister expresses his or her posi-
tion, and perhaps even before the government forms any position at all.38 
Last, with regard to the prevailing consensual mode of decision-making 
36  Indeed, on the basis of the data from the subsidiarity checks organised by COSAC du-
ring 2005-2009, Kaczynski found that: ‘Tellingly, in bicameral systems the national senates 
are usually more active than national lower chambers’ (see Piotr Maciej Kaczynski, ‘Paper 
Tigers or Sleeping Beauties? National Parliaments in the Post-Lisbon European Political 
System (CEPS Special Report, February 20011)).
37  Bargaining theory confirms both with abstract models and with empirical experiments 
that the credible prior commitment of one party to a certain outcome improves its bargai-
ning position. However, this may be counterproductive – the public commitment made by 
the parliament may hinder the chances for the minister to exchange his or her support 
on this issue for support for another issue that is more important for the state. The latter 
rationale may discourage ministers from using parliaments strategically, yet if they do use 
them, the effect can be to have less log-rolling and more principled decision-making in the 
Council.
38  Such a race of parliament with government may look as hopeless as the race of the 
proverbial tortoise with Achilles, yet one should bear in mind that many decisions (up to 
90%, according to M Mattila quoted by Ana Fraga, ‘After the Convention: The Future Role 
of National Parliaments in the European Union (And the Day after ... Nothing Will Happen)’ 
(2005) 11 Journal of Legislative Studies) are made not by ministers in the Council, but by 
senior public officials in COREPER and the working parties which precede it. While Fraga 
notes this as a reason for the hopelessness of parliamentary involvement, it may work both 
ways. Frank Häge suggests that one of the reasons for bureaucrats not to agree on a bill 
in COREPER/working parties and to push it up to ministerial level (B item on the Council 
agenda) is their being uncertain about the position of their minister (Frank M Häge, ‘Poli-
ticizing Council Decision-making: The Effect of EP Empowerment’ (paper presented at the 
Legislators of Europe EUI SPS Workshop, April 2009)). If informed by a formal opinion of 
their national parliament, national bureaucrats can start behaving in ways yet unseen.
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in the Council (even where qualified majority voting is the formal rule)39 it 
is highly probable that a series of well-grounded negative opinions from 
one third of the NPs will be sufficiently persuasive for a few ministers to 
change their mind and vote down the proposal, even if most of the other 
power players choose to ignore them.40 Dougan recognises that: 
if a sufficient number of national parliaments were to register serio-
us objections to a given legislative proposal on subsidiarity grounds, 
the political costs for the Union institutions of simply ignoring that 
opposition – or at least, of doing so on any sort of regular basis – wo-
uld be severe.41 
For all these reasons, I am inclined to think that the EWM will provi-
de sufficient incentive for NPs to engage at least occasionally in substan-
tive discussions on draft European legislation. Even if the resources of 
the NPs, which will remain limited, make their actual interventions rare, 
it is sufficient for a single such precedent to substantially change the Eu-
ropean legislative process and place it under the shadow of the EWM.  It 
should also be noted that even if these incentives for the NPs do not work 
all the way down to the actual adoption of reasoned opinion and that the 
parliament ultimately abandons the issue, misses the deadline or defers 
to the government, it will still make a huge difference if this was done 
after a robust deliberation on the substance of the European issue in 
the national public space. Even when nothing happens in terms of power 
politics, there may be a significant difference in terms of public resonan-
ce. The experience of the Select Committees of the House of Commons is 
a good example of this: they were introduced in 1979 for the purpose of 
‘redressing’ the balance of power in the UK, they made no impact on the 
power balance, yet because of their publicity-related functions they were 
considered a success.42 
39  For a recent empirical study, see Daniel Naurin & Helen Wallace, Unveiling the Council 
of the European Union: Games Governments Play in Brussels (Palgrave Macmillan 2008).
40  Further to these reasons, we may consider the decision of the German Constitutional 
Court on the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty, which made use of several of its pro-
cedures (bridging clauses and the flexibility clause) dependent on prior authorisation of 
the Bundestag in each particular case, which guarantees its greater involvement with the 
respective issues (BVerfG, Judgment of 30 June 2009).
41  Dougan (n 34) 658.
42  The Convention itself is another example of the soft power of deliberative democratic 
institutions: the Convention did not have any substantive powers (and was composed pre-
dominantly of members of national parliaments with all their usual disincentives), yet the 
Constitution drafted by it was adopted by the governments with almost no changes (and 
despite the fierce opposition of one veto player – the Polish government). The power of the 
Convention was only in its openness to the public and its ability to focus public attention in 
all Member States. Its deliberations were closely followed by the media across all countries, 
and it managed to mobilise public expectations for support of its project, creating a true 
‘constitutional momentum’. 
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What has been left out of the discussion so far is the need for a con-
siderable amount of concerted action of NPs to reach the threshold if the 
EWM is to take off. This is the critical premise, which may either lead to 
the generation of a European communicative network, or may make the 
EWM completely redundant. The EWM is the best institutional incentive 
one can provide for NPs to cooperate with each other, but whether they 
will actually pick it remains to be seen. A note of scepticism is necessary 
here: in order to be able to use the mechanism, parliaments have to in-
vest considerable resources, with the burden placed on the first mover. 
So, they will be tempted to wait for the reasoned opinions of their peers 
and join by copy-pasting them, which would naturally lead to the inac-
tion of all. Yet, it is quite likely that there will be a few entrepreneurial 
chambers43 to launch the process and enable all to realise the extent of 
their new power. Still, if there are several initial failures, the EWM will 
probably be abandoned. The comparison with COSAC, which is largely 
ignored, bodes ill, but it should be noted that COSAC does not have any 
of the initiatives available through the EWM.44  
Let me be clear:  even if the NPs pick the incentive provided by the 
EWM, this will not change significantly the institutional balance and 
the relative weight of NPs, either in the EU or regarding their own go-
vernments.  The only thing we can expect the NPs to do is to engage 
seriously in debates on substantive European issues, which so far they 
rationally ignore. And this is all we need to bring Europe home and, to 
paraphrase Leo Amery’s oft-quoted summary of the functions of the Bri-
tish Parliament, to ‘secure full discussion and ventilation of all matters’45 
of European interest. This is echoed today by Francesco Rizzuto: 
In the absence of Union-wide mechanisms to aggregate and articula-
te political choices, the legitimacy of the European Union will only be 
enhanced effectively …. if national constitutional norms, procedures 
and political practices are modified to render the EU/member state 
interface more visible46 
and also by Michael Dougan, who notes that the new responsibility 
of the NPs ‘could increase the accountability and legitimacy of the EU’s 
lawmaking bodies, and enhance in an unprecedented way the sense of 
43  Ironically, the parliaments of the most Eurosceptic countries may be expected to make 
the biggest contribution to the generation of the European communicative network.
44  The EWM can raise the importance of COSAC as well. Even though its meetings will 
continue to have no substantive output, they are the most likely place for the members of 
the national parliament to develop the necessary network capital.
45  Leo Amery, in an oft-quoted description of the function of the British parliament (Leo 
Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution (OUP 1947) 12).
46  Francesco Rizzuto, ‘National Parliaments and the European Union: Part of the Problem 
or Part of the Solution to the Democratic Deficit in the European Constitutional Settle-
ment?’ (2003) 9 Journal of Legislative Studies 106 (emphasis added).
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“ownership” of the European project at national level’.47 Ana Fraga, who 
is otherwise very sceptical about the EWM (and indeed about other pro-
posals for the involvement of NPs discussed at the Convention), also re-
cognises that:
by setting a threshold for the number of parliaments’ votes, together 
with the requirement to provide reasoned opinions, [the EWM] cre-
ates incentives for a greater exchange of information between the 
NPs, as each parliament will need information if one of the others is 
planning to submit an opinion stating that the incentive breaches 
the principle of subsidiarity.48
More generally, Thomas Risse takes note of 
[the] general agreement that modern democracies rely upon multi-
ple channels of intermediation between private actors in civil society 
and public authorities in order to insure the legitimacy and effecti-
veness of governance.49 
One such important transnational channel is expected to emerge if 
the NPs engage in a network of communication and if this leads to the de-
velopment of an overarching public sphere. It should be remembered that 
the reasoned opinions are to be negative, ie they will promote precisely 
critical public opinion, and they will enable the network of parliaments to 
become the ‘critical authority’ which ‘subjects to publicity’ the exercise 
of political and social power by the EU.50 This critical and transnational 
public discourse is what legitimises the rulemaking. According to Ha-
bermas, the critical condition for democracy to exist is the availability of 
communication structures at every level of opinion- and will-formation, 
and law- and policy-making: 
if discourses … are the site where a rational will can take shape, then 
the legitimacy of law ultimately depends on a communicative arran-
gement: as partici pants in rational discourses, consociates under 
law must be able to examine whether a contested norm meets with, 
or could meet with, the agreement of all those possibly affected.51 
In my reading of Habermas in the preceding section, all we need is 
for the citizens of Europe to ‘have at their prior disposal the social per-
spective of a practical reason that tests laws’.52 This critical exami-
47  Dougan (n 34) 659.
48  Fraga (n 38) 499.
49  Thomas Risse, ‘An Emerging European Public Sphere? Theoretical Clarifications and 
Empirical Indicators’ (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the European Union Studi-
es Association (EUSA) 2003) 2.
50  Habermas, Public Sphere (n 4) 236. 
51  Habermas, BFN (n 4) 103-104 (emphasis added).
52  Habermas, BFN (n 4) 93 (emphasis added).
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nation of European legislation by concerned publics has so far been 
missing in the EU. This critical testing can happen in two mutually 
enforcing modes – in formal institutions like the European Parlia-
ment or NPs, as well as in the media. Given the central place the par-
liaments still occupy in national public spaces and the media attention 
they still enjoy, it is a fair assumption that if parliaments communicate 
in the institutional network provided by the EWM, the development of 
intense communication among the national public in the informal media 
network will follow. In several recent studies, Thomas Risse and his 
collaborators found some evidence for the emergence of a European 
public sphere (‘common meaning structures and frames of reference’ 
in the media debates53), but so far it has been very thin. Thus, the 
EU remains elitist and undemocratic.
Of the many reasons which have so far obstructed the development 
of the paneuropean public sphere, there is one that deserves particular 
attention and it is the insulation of NPs from each other. Hanna Arendt 
notes that the very enclosure of the Greek polis by walls created the ago-
ra – a protected domestic space ‘where free men could meet as peers on 
any occasion’ and that the ‘public space does not become political until it 
is secured within a city, is bound’.54 Similarly, modern democracy deve-
loped within the enclosing borders of the emergent nation states. Thus, 
nowadays, established national public spaces tend to enclose themselves 
against external, ie European, influences in an act of self-protection. The 
modest promise of the EWM is to penetrate these impermeable national 
public spheres; a more ambitious one is to create a virtual agora, where 
MPs from various Member States can meet as peers on any occasion. 
Demos or demoi: communicative network and shared culture
The reasons why the EWM should work as elaborated in the prece-
ding section allow me for this section to assume counterfactually that 
the EWM has already taken off, in order to compare the advantages of 
a communicative network of demoi to those of the single public sphere 
of a demos (the latter being no less counterfactual). A smoothly working 
EWM would mean that (1) NPs engage in debates of at least some sub-
stantive European legislation; (2) this engagement of the NPs has promp-
ted rather robust discussion on these issues in national public spheres; 
and (3) on these issues there is considerable transnational exchange of 
arguments between NPs and the media. If these assumptions hold, it will 
53  Risse (n 49) 3. See also Marianne  van de Steeg & Thomas Risse, ‘The Emergence 
of a European Community of Communication (2007) Working Paper  <http://www.isn.
ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-
A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=31385> accessed 15 September 2011.
54  Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics (Schocken Books 2007) 123.
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follow that some genuine European issues will be identified, possibly in a 
single public sphere and debated in several public spheres in generalised 
(ie non-parochial) terms. The question that arises here is whether the 
existence of such a network for transnational communication and criti-
cism is premised on the existence of common values and identity. Certa-
inly, communication may be catalysed by common values and identity, 
but can it flourish without them? 
The theory of deliberative democracy seems to provide ground for 
a positive answer, with Habermas himself noting that government by 
common public opinion is possible when 
the same themes … acquire simultaneously the same relevance for 
a large public that remained anonymous and … spur citizens sepa-
rated by great distances to make spontaneous contributions. This 
process gives rise to public opinions that aggregate themes and atti-
tudes to the point where they exercise political influence.55  
Remarkably, he emphasises the need for ‘a network that gives ci-
tizens of all member states an equal opportunity to take part in an en-
compassing process of focused political communication’ which requires 
on one hand ‘institutionalised deliberation and decision-making within 
parliaments’ and on the other ‘an inclusive process of informal mass 
communication’.56 Indeed, he speaks about a European public sphere 
in the singular but most importantly he defines it in functional terms, 
so it may very well have functional equivalents in other forms. If a single 
identity-based EU-wide public sphere is not possible or not desirable, its 
function may be taken by an institutionalised deliberative network aro-
und which a web of informal transnational channels develops to connect 
the simultaneous discourses in the national public spheres. There is pre-
cious little evidence that the second is possible and already happening 
(albeit to a very limited extent) – Risse’s studies of media reporting on 
particular European issues showed a high degree of similarity in the way 
‘the same European themes are discussed at the same time at similar 
levels of attention across national public spheres’, although the overall 
attention paid to these issues remains low in comparison with the nati-
onal topics: ‘People do not talk about Europe that often, but if and when 
they do, they establish a community of communication across borders’.57
These deliberations on European issues which transcend the sin-
gle domestic public sphere and take place in separate but simultaneous 
spaces that are still nationally centred, I believe, are both more likely 
and more desirable for democracy in Europe. They would constitute a 
55  Habermas, The Other (n 4) 153.
56  Habermas, ‘Why Europe’ (n 13) 17.
57  Risse (n 49) 9 (emphasis added).
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demoi-cracy – a polity of multiple communities, which is ‘realized through 
interlinked procedures and multiple participations of citizens’.58 Thus, 
demoi-cracy is different from federation and confederation in that it pro-
vides an institutionalised network where citizens from distinct demoi de-
liberate together horizontally across borders. Only such a network would 
allow the many demoi to ‘turn relevant societal problems into topics of 
concern’.59 So far, most European problems have been identified and sol-
ved by a black-boxed entity referred to as ‘Brussels’, and even though 
it is doing relatively well in terms of output, it remains remote; what is 
missing is communication with citizens. Citizens cannot have democratic 
input on decision-making, nor can they hear the justification, nor can 
they challenge this justification in a public forum. Calls for intensified 
deliberations between European institutions and citizens are common, 
but vertical solutions would work in a state (or federation); what is nee-
ded is horizontal deliberations among citizens with regard to European 
policies.60
Habermas stands very close to this vision when noting that the real 
advance towards a European ‘sphere of publics’ would be ‘the natio-
nal media to cover the substance of relevant controversies in the other 
countries’.61 The EWM should be good on this, as NPs, to mobilise the 
support of their peers across borders, will have to find a way to communi-
cate their domestic concerns to them. Unlike governments, who also need 
support in Council votes, parliaments are unable to speak with a single 
voice in private, so all interests will be present in the discussion, and all 
arguments subjected to public scrutiny. 
In the famous ‘Declaration’, as well as in many of his other recent 
papers, Habermas maintains that the ‘shared political culture’ is another 
condition for this model to work. If he meant culture in a weak sense 
(recognition of the other, of the rule of law and other basic principles of 
democracy) it is a sine qua non indeed, but to this extent it is already 
available. If political culture is taken in any stronger sense, its necessity 
must be justified, and generally there are two ways. The first is the dis-
58  Francis Cheneval and Frank Schimmelfenning, ‘The Case for Demoicracy in the EU’ (pa-
per presented at the European Union Studies Association Conference, Boston, March 2011) 
<http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/8h_cheneval.pdf> accessed 15 September 2011. For 
a comprehensive discussion of the meaning and the theoretical background of the concept 
of demoi-cracy, see Jan-Werner Müller, ‘The Promise of “Demoi-Cracy”: Democracy, Di-
versity, and Domination in the European Public Order’ in Jürgen Neyer and Antije Wiener 
(eds.) Political Theory of the European Union (OUP, 2010).  
59  Habermas, ‘Why Europe’ (n 13) 18.
60  Ironically, the key to more democracy in the EU lies in the national political systems. 
Cheneval and Schimmelfenning rightly point out that the EU is approaching the standards 
for demoi-cracy, but the demoi-cratic deficit is at the national level. See Cheneval and Sc-
himmelfenning (n 58), 
61  Habermas, ‘Why Europe’ (n 13) 18.
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cussed need for a degree of solidarity among citizens which can make a 
European social democracy possible. Legitimate or desirable as it may be, 
it was argued above that this is a separate goal, contingent and posterior 
to the European liberal democracy. The second justification is that the 
shared culture is instrumental to enable the communication itself. In the 
remainder of this section I will discuss this latter rationale.
Shared culture matters. The existing shared traditions and civic cul-
ture do enable understanding and agreement between people and this is 
precisely why the existing identities direct public debates to the national 
fora and not to the European forum. Hence, even in the longer run, any 
switch of the limited attention people pay to politics in a ‘European’ di-
rection is unlikely. A possible parliamentarisation of the EU will not cre-
ate European public space comparable to national public spaces around 
local parliaments any time soon. 
Thus, the EU appears to be quite a unique polity which must provide 
governance at one level, while the citizens affected by that governance 
scrutinise it together, if at all, at another level. Still, this should not be a 
problem – if European-level issues are discussed at the national level in 
terms of the European level. Alas, currently European issues are discu-
ssed at the national level but only in national terms. This parochialism 
is allowed by the closed borders of national public spheres. Now, the 
political leaders do not need to speak to the citizens of the other states 
and that is why they do not need to frame their arguments in European 
rather than national terms. It turns out that the robust parochial dis-
course in the national public spheres chokes the nascent discourse in 
the emerging European public sphere. This problem was recognised from 
as early as the Amsterdam Treaty, and its Protocol on the Role of Nati-
onal Parliaments was an attempt to engage the national publics in dis-
cussion on matters of EU governance. This attempt did not deliver, and 
the robust debates are still going on, mostly within the public spheres of 
Member States on national issues. If nations are, and if they remain, the 
main deliberating fora, then it seems natural to devise institutional ways 
to bring into them European issues in European terms, rather than con-
struct new spaces or identities to compete with them. The Early Warning 
Mechanism provides one possible way to square this circle – to employ 
the potency of national discourses to deliberate on EU governance, and, 
conversely, to make national discussions heard Europe-wide.62 Whether 
this mechanism will succeed in bringing democracy to the EU ‘depen-
62  The Lisbon judgment of the German Constitutional Court (see note 38 above) can be 
seen both as protective of the national public sphere against the transfer of influence to 
Europe, but also as bringing European discourse home by requiring the involvement of the 
Bundestag with European issues on an ad hoc basis, especially in the case of employment 
of the flexibility clause.
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ds not on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization of 
the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication, as well 
as on the interplay of institutionalized deliberative processes with infor-
mally constituted public opinions’.63 And these are Habermas’s words, 
not mine.
The advantage of this idea in comparison to the constructivist pro-
ject is that in this way the EU and Member States can, instead of com-
peting, build upon each other. As Nicolaidis suggests: ‘Contrary to the 
fears of many supranationalists … national level democratic control over 
the expansion of EU powers does not mean “less” Europe’.64 Democratic 
control over the exercise of EU powers means ‘more’ Europe, as it brings 
the European issues into the most robust public spheres available so 
that they will affect the opinions that are formed in these spheres. Thus, 
European citizens will be actively participating in European governance 
by virtue of their participation in democratic processes at national level.65
It should be noted that even though identity may not necessarily be 
a sine qua non for public deliberation of matters of common governance, 
it greatly facilitates the discourse and this is precisely why the existing 
national public spheres successfully compete with the nascent European 
one despite the institutional promotion of the latter. The reason is simple 
- within a national public sphere, there is no reason for the discussion to 
be focused on the most pressing European issue, and even if this hap-
pens the issue need not be discussed in generalised (other-regarding) 
terms. Even in the Member States where extensive control of national 
parliaments already exists (eg in Scandinavian ones), it does not require 
cooperation with other national parliaments, so their discussions may 
remain parochial. What is necessary for the discourse started in one na-
tional public sphere to transcend it is for it to be phrased in such a way 
as to be understandable to the citizens in the other public spheres, ie to 
be phrased according to ‘common meaning structures and frames of refe-
rence’, in Risse’s terms. He calls the communities which have developed 
such frames of references which facilitate understanding ‘communities of 
meaning’ and has found evidence for the emergence of such a community 
of communication in Europe. The introduced notion of communicative 
communities is not a new guise for identity construction: community is 
meant here only in an epistemological sense: a group of people who are 
able to understand each other. They need not agree on anything of sub-
63  Habermas, BFN (n 4) 298 (emphasis added).
64  Kalypso Nicolaidis & Stephen Weatherill (eds), Whose Europe? National Models and the 
Constitution of the European Union (OUP 2003) 145.
65  It should also be noted that the promise of the EWM is that the critical discourse in 
national parliaments is not only robust but also inclusive, as inclusive as the demoi are in 
the Member States.
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stance, but the only thing necessary is that citizens are mutually aware 
of each other’s viewpoints. Risse calls this ‘identity’ light, ‘since it does 
not imply a deep sense of loyalty toward each other’.66 
It should also be noted that even if this community of communi-
cation develops further in the course of future European deliberations, 
it will always remain much weaker than the national communities of 
communication, which are in a much better competitive position along 
this epistemic dimension as well. That is why the NPs will remain the pro-
per fora for public deliberation on substantive European issues even in 
the long run. If the European demos is taken to mean citizens discussing 
together issues of public interest, it will hardly ever come into existence. 
Therefore, any solution of the democratic deficit should involve retaining 
the central role of NPs, where citizens do talk together, and finding an 
effective institutional device to link them in such a way that people start 
listening to each other across the existing boundaries. Now I turn to the 
EWM again to discuss whether it can become such a device in the light 
of its first year in force. 
The first year(s): half full or half empty? 
After elaborating why the EWM and NPs would make a difference, I 
now turn to the empirical evidence on whether they do have any impact. 
So far, there has been little evidence that the expected collaboration even 
begins to happen. As of 1 June 2011, there has not been a single case 
where a yellow card was raised to a legislative draft. The Commission 
proudly takes this as proof that its proposals conform to the subsidiarity 
principle, but the more realistic explanation is that the EWM has not 
delivered yet. 
Of course, one and a half years is a period too short for any conclu-
sion to be drawn, but we should have in mind that the first experiments 
with the mechanism started well before its formal introduction with the 
Treaty of Lisbon. On the other hand, during that period, quite a number 
of initiatives started and reasoned opinions were issued even if the card 
threshold was never met. 
COSAC started experimenting with the EWM in 2005 in the aftermath 
of the Convention. It selected several legislative proposals which were dis-
tributed to the NPs, which adopted reasoned opinions. There were eight 
such checks; the highest participation rate was in 2009 when 36 (out of 
40) chambers from 25 Member States delivered opinions (of these, only 
66  It is true that, as Risse notes, ‘the more we debate issues, the more we engage each 
other in our public discourses, the more we actually create political communities’. However, 
this may be the eventual long-term result of the communication, and by no means its pre-
condition.
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one was negative). The highest rejection rate was in the first check (2005) 
when 15 (out of 50) opinions found a violation of the subsidiary principle. 
These experiments are considered to be generally successful and show 
that the NPs have the capacity to engage in scrutiny of substantive (and 
quite technical!) EU legislation. What is more important for the argument 
advanced here is that they have collaborated to enhance their capacities. 
NPs have also established a specialised system for electronic information 
exchange – the Inter-parliamentary EU Information Exchange (IPEX) and 
now use it to inform each other when a chamber is subjecting a certain 
European bill to a subsidiary check. The other way for coordination is the 
regular Monday Morning Meetings of the representatives of NPs in Bru-
ssels.67 There is one noteworthy internal limitation that most of the NPs 
have not overcome – in most chambers the final decision on the reasoned 
opinion must be adopted by the full plenary or after a cycle of consultati-
ons between various committees, which delays the process.68
The second way the NPs were involved in substantive EU policy-ma-
king before the EWM entered into force was the so-called Barroso initia-
tive. In 2006, the Commission undertook69 to forward to the NPs all draft 
bills and consultation papers and invited them to express their opinions 
on them. The invited opinions were not to be limited to subsidiarity alone, 
but could raise any substantive issues.70 
Jans and Piedrafita noted that some NPs have quite actively explo-
ited the opportunities for involvement and since 2005 the Commission 
has received 450 opinions from 33 chambers from 24 Member States.71 
More importantly, the number of submissions is increasing with time. The 
Commission cared to respond to about 100 of them, yet an actual diffe-
rence made by such a submission is yet to be seen. As suggested here, 
the absence of an observable policy change resulting from a submission 
is not a huge problem, as it is the involvement of NPs which is valuable 
per se. Yet, if this tendency continues, the parliamentarians (and their 
constituencies) who cannot see the impact of their opinions will cease to 
submit them. If in future this turns out to be a problem, the incentive of 
NPs to become involved can be strengthened through the introduction of 
a ‘red card’ mechanism triggered by a higher majority. In such a case, 
stalemate should not be feared because if the threshold for a yellow card 
67  See Kaczynski (n 36) 11.
68  ibid.
69  Commission, ‘A Citizens’ Agenda – Delivering Results for Europe’ COM (2006) 211 final. 
70  After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, COSAC discontinued its experiments, but the 
Barroso initiative is supposedly still operational (although I could find no evidence of the 
NPs using it outside the subsidiarity checks pursuant to EWM). 
71  See Theo Jans and Sonia Piedrafita, ‘The Role of National Parliaments in European De-
cision-Making’ EIPASCOPE 2009/1.
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is reached only too rarely, the red card will be even rarer. However, the 
hint of a possibility for such serious consequences will motivate both the 
NPs and the Community institutions to engage substantively with the 
drafts through the EWM.72 
The first year of experience with the EWM itself was not so succe-
ssful: ‘only 59% of the scrutiny processes initiated were completed on 
time’.73 There were two cases when enough NPs initiated a scrutiny pro-
cedure to raise a yellow card. However, most of them could not deliver 
the opinions on time, so they actually reached only 11% and 13% of the 
necessary votes. Kaczynski’s conclusion is that ‘both cases have shown 
that the real capacity (not virtual as in the try-outs) to produce a reaso-
ned opinion claiming a subsidiarity breach is questionable’.74 
What was more disappointing for the expectations elaborated abo-
ve was that even if some of the parliaments engaged fairly intensively 
with subsidiarity checks, they did so individually and did not coordinate 
with each other. Their failure to communicate together suggests that the 
COSAC experiments were successful because they were initiated and or-
chestrated by its secretariat. Worse still, relative success in those cases 
might suggest that at least some institutional capacity was available, so 
what was missing was the initiative. Looking on the bright side, there 
were two cases when the incentive was sufficient for 16 and 20 parlia-
ments to start the procedure,75 yet the capacity to finish on time (without 
orchestration) was missing. Thus, the most immediate explanation of the 
modest results of the first year is that the eight weeks that NPs have to 
adopt their opinion is too short for a parliament to react. However, it is 
much longer in practice as the drafts are forwarded to each NP after they 
have been translated, while the MPs use the English version in the me-
antime. 
Another explanation is that subsidiarity is too narrow an issue, and 
this is often deplored both by academia and the NPs themselves. Philip 
Norton,76 the House of Lords77 and several other parliaments have voiced 
72  Similarly, Raunio argues that the introduction of the red card would allow national MPs 
to take the EWM seriously. (Tapio Raunio, ‘Destined for Irrelevance? Subsidiarity Control 
by National Parliaments’ (2010) Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid, Working Paper 36/2010.
73  Kaczynski (n 36) 11.
74  Kaczynski (n 36) 13.
75  With 18 and 25 votes amounting to 33% and 46% respectively. Data provided by Kaczyn-
ski (n 36) 13.
76  Philip Norton, ‘National Parliaments and the Lisbon Treaty’ (The Norton View, 12 Feb-
ruary 2011) <http://nortonview.wordpress.com/2011/02/12/national-parliaments-and-
the-lisbon-treaty/> accessed 15 September 2011.
77  European Union Committee, The EU Reform Treaty: Work in Progress (HL 2006-07, 180) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeucom/180/18002.
htm> accessed 15 September 2011.
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the opinion that NPs are actually more concerned with violations of the 
proportionality principle and there is no reason for scrutiny of the two 
to be separated.78 In other cases, NPs voiced their confusion concerning 
what subsidiarity is. I still maintain, as suggested earlier, that the fuzzi-
ness of the term can be exploited by the NPs and that it allows them to 
opine on anything. Apparently, however, this may happen only after they 
come to terms with using it. 
An even more pertinent explanation is the inertia of both MPs and 
bureaucracy. One and a half years is quite insufficient for both to learn 
how to use the mechanism. Adam Lazowski provides telling examples 
of the struggle of European bureaucracy to publish new legislation in 
the Official Journal in the languages of the new Member States for quite 
some time after their accession.79 The use of the EWM seems more com-
plicated, so the learning process can be expected to take longer. Indeed, 
it might be a matter of learning - Kaczynski observes that ‘the existing 
trend of growing communication between the Commission and national 
parliaments … can suggest a growing awareness in some of national par-
liaments about the possibilities of influencing the EU decision-making 
process’.80 Of course, the danger is that if learning takes too long, the 
impetus of the new may be lost and the EWM forgotten.   
Yet another explanation – a worrisome one – is that NPs are already 
disappointed at the lack of impact of their positions. Norton bitterly notes 
that the experience the NPs have already had within the Barroso initiative 
has been counterproductive as, even though some of them were regularly 
submitting observations, these had no impact on the legislation at all.81 
The EWM, like many other novelties, is facing a chicken and egg pro-
blem – in order to make a difference, NPs have to actively engage in the 
scrutiny of draft legislation, but the MPs will engage only if they expect 
to make a difference (so that they can impress their constituencies). This 
is well understood by the House of Lords which noted in one report that:
the raising of a yellow card would have a significant effect on the EU 
institutions … if national parliaments operate the mechanism effec-
78  In my view, the reason is that observance of proportionality is believed to be effectively 
controlled by courts, while subsidiarity has always been considered to be nonjusticiable 
and unenforceable in practice. Thus, the Convention struggled to find a solution to this 
problem and came up with the EWM.
79  Adam Lazowski, ‘The Absorption Capacity of the European Union and Lisbon Treaty’ 
(presentation at the Jean Monnet seminar ‘Advanced Issues of European Law’, Dubrovnik, 
April 2011).
80  Kaczynski (n 36) 13.
81  Norton (n 76). Yet he seems optimistic: ‘The way forward, in my view, is the bottom-up 
approach, with like-minded national parliaments getting together and doing so not only 
with regard to draft legislative proposals but also at a much earlier stage and seeking to 
influence the agenda rather than simply waiting to see what comes along’.
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tively it would be hard for the Commission and the Council to resist 
such a sustained political pressure.82
Finally, the most unfortunate explanation for the so-far modest re-
sults is that European citizens are disinterested in substantive EU policy 
issues and this is why institutional mechanisms such as the EWM will 
be insufficient to incentivise their representatives to engage in them. If 
this is the case, the prospects for bringing the Union closer to its citizens 
look much grimmer. Indeed, the mechanism relies too much on the MPs83 
who must be very entrepreneurial to venture into the EWM. Jans and 
Piedrafita note that ‘the ability of individual MPs to influence European 
policies is extremely limited and a strong focus on EU affairs may not be 
instrumental in attracting voters’, yet they hope that ‘l’appetit s’acroit en 
mangeant’.84 If the argument of this article that engagement through the 
NPs is the only avenue for the democratisation of the EU is correct, we 
should hope that the interest of both MPs and the public may increase 
over time. At the very least, if the tendency for increased involvement re-
mains, ‘there would be less room for political anti-Brussels accusations, 
as politically the national parliaments would now be co-responsible for 
the European legislation’.85 The source of his optimism is the fact that so 
far at least some of the NPs have exhibited an appetite for involvement. 
With a little more temperate optimism, it is also observed that ‘in the long 
run, this could … make it harder for national governments to play the 
“parliamentary card” when meeting their colleagues in Brussels’.86 Thus, 
at the very least, if the EWM remains redundant and does not foster 
inter-parliamentary communication, its very existence may reduce the 
opportunities for shifting responsibilities which fuel Euroscepticism.
82  European Union Committee, Strengthening National Parliamentary Scrutiny of the EU – 
the Constitution’s Subsidiarity Early Warning Mechanism (HL 2004-05,101), quoted in Wyatt 
(n 34) 12.
83  And especially on those from the opposition, since those from the government majority 
may have better channels for policy influence.
84  Jans and Piedrafita (n 71). Further, they note that even if all of the available mechani-
sms for involvement are weak, ‘if we consider the combined effect of the different avenues 
in a dynamic perspective, they may jointly trigger a reassertion of national parliamentary 
influence in the European policy process’.
85  Kaczynski (n 36) 14. Similarly, Wyatt suggests that the ECJ may interpret the lack of a 
yellow card by the NPs as their implicit endorsement of the draft legislation as far as subsi-
diarity is concerned (Wyatt (n 34) 12).
86  Bruno de Witte, Alexander Trechsel, Dragana Damijanovic, Elin Hellquist, Jo-
seph Hien, Paolo Ponzano, ‘Legislating after Lisbon: New Opportunities for the EP 
(2010) EUDO study <http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO/Documents/EUDO-Legislatin 
gafterLisbon%28SD%29.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011.
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Conclusion
In Karen Schiele’s phrase, the EU suffers from adherence to the con-
cept of nation-state, and Habermas has not overcome this concept. He 
deconstructs the concept of demos-nation, but only to call for its recon-
struction in a broader and thinner version at a European level. This is em-
pirically difficult, as nations are here to stay, and theoretically disappoin-
tingly modest. His concept is supranationalist, and all that it can deliver 
is the re-creation of the nation on a larger scale. Habermas acknowledges 
this modesty – ‘the challenge before us is not to invent anything but to 
conserve the great democratic achievements of the European nation-sta-
te, beyond its own limits’.87 I believe the Early Warning Mechanism in-
troduced by the Lisbon Treaty promotes a truly postnationalist option by 
allowing complete separation of the ideas of demos and democracy. The 
EWM may be not sufficient, or may remain redundant, yet it is a step in 
the right direction, while the constructivist project is not.
Beyond the EWM, in this article I have argued for the possibility of 
demoi-cracy: a truly postnationalist democracy, where discourses are not 
mediated by nationality, even though for the time being they will remain 
clustered in nation-centred public spheres (and to a certain extent will be 
mediated by nation-centred political parties). To the extent that commu-
nication transcends national spheres, the democratic deficit of the EU 
will be overcome. 
A more sweeping conclusion is that democracy is impossible, not 
without (single) demos, but without shared space and robust public dis-
course on the general issues of common interest, and the demos should 
be conceived as the most common public space. However, if the cosiness 
of a single space is not available, a network will do. Habermas is right 
that on 15 February 2003 the European Public Sphere was born, but not 
because of the displayed unity of values, but because the same European 
theme was discussed at the same time with the same level of attention 
across national public spheres, and the level of attention was the highest 
one. Here it is suggested that a demoi-cracy, an institutionalised network 
where many demoi deliberate together, can make such so-far sporadic 
events a matter of course.  It is unclear yet whether the Early Warning 
Mechanism can bring this about, as it is a means that has never been 
tried. But the purpose is also to achieve something that has never been 
done. 
87  Habermas, ‘Why Europe’ (n 13) 6.
